India Needs A New Playbook For Managing Its Troubled Neighbourhood

India lives in a tough neighbourhood of fragile states. Many of the smaller states in the subcontinent are beset with internal strife on the one hand and near economic collapse on the other, creating a vicious cycle of popular dissatisfaction, leading to forced regime changes. It is also a bitter fact for India that, more often than not, the rulers of these states, going through tumultuous times, try to escape the wrath of their populace by blaming New Delhi for their troubles.

Yet, the fact that India’s strategists have as yet not been able to create a playbook for either managing them or even predicting which way the wind will blow in these neighbouring capitals in order to take proactive steps to contain the occasional coup comes as more than a surprise to most observers.

Two almost identical colour revolutions occurred in the neighbourhood over the last year or so. Students mobilised through social media apps stormed the streets of Dhaka a year ago, forcing the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government to flee. A year later, in an identical manner, Kathmandu witnessed riotous scenes, with Gen-Z protestors rampaging through the streets and attacking houses of politicians after campaigns vilifying the ruling elite using TikTok apps.

India, which was caught on the wrong foot in Bangladesh’s case, seems to have been caught walking blind in Nepal, too. Though to be fair, South Block did manage to react faster to the anarchy unfolding in Kathmandu and possibly bolstered the hands of the Nepalese Army in bringing about a far less chaotic change of government and ensuring that elections were promised within a set time frame.

This was unlike Bangladesh, where even after 14 months an unelected, interim government remains in place. Under the new regime, mob violence and arrests of journalists, academics and opposition workers, besides anti-India pronouncements by members of the government, have become a new normal.

What Should India Do?: India has two strands to its foreign policy—aspiring to be a developed country while consolidating its position as a regional power.

To this end, India has propounded since the 1990s a policy, now named ‘Neighbourhood First’, in many ways similar to the late US President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘Good Neighbour’ policy for South America at the beginning of the 19th century.

The policy stems from smaller South Asian nations’ wariness of India’s power and history of interventions—from aiding Bangladesh’s 1971 liberation and peacekeeping in Sri Lanka in 1987 to thwarting mercenaries in the Maldives in 1988—even though these actions largely served humanitarian or stabilising purposes.

However, a policy of being a ‘Good Neighbour’ has its limitations. It can only be exercised when the neighbourhood is indeed a nation’s backyard.

The US and other Western powers have always been keen players in South Asia, at times in a manner which was contrary to Indian interests, even as they signed defence and strategic deals with New Delhi. While that could have been managed, given India’s importance to the West in containing China, the Middle Kingdom itself has emerged as the new “big boy” intent on playing the South Asian turf.

When Pakistan felt that the US cover to its security interests through SEATO and CENTO was not enough to save it from the Indian wrath over its many misadventures on Indian soil, China became Islamabad’s all-weather friend and was offered the strategically located Gwadar port to link China’s landlocked Sinkiang to the Arabian Sea.

Both Pakistan and Bangladesh now use mostly Chinese-made weaponry. Some 81% of Islamabad’s arms imports in the last five years have been from Beijing, while Chinese-built defence systems account for nearly 70% of Bangladesh’s armoury.

Since the interim administration of Muhammad Yunus, a controversial social entrepreneur, assumed power in August last year, Chinese officials have stepped up their courtship of Dhaka, holding at least seven high-level meetings with Bangladeshi political leaders.

The pattern reflects a broader diplomatic outreach by Beijing towards the Indian subcontinent. This year alone, Chinese envoys have met Pakistani counterparts 22 times, while also maintaining steady engagement with Nepal and Sri Lanka.

China’s influence in Bangladesh has grown sharply. Four months ago, its commerce minister led a 250-member delegation to Dhaka, followed by the first-ever China–Bangladesh–Pakistan trilateral in Kunming, forming a joint working group on investment and infrastructure.

The move signalled Beijing’s ability to bypass BIMSTEC, much as India sidelined SAARC.

The US has countered with intense diplomacy, its envoy meeting Bangladesh’s top officials and service chiefs, and military exercises near Chittagong. Speculation about an “Arakan corridor” to aid Myanmar’s anti-junta rebels underscores how Bangladesh has become a new front in the China–US rivalry.

Under the circumstances, India, while maintaining its ‘Good Neighbour’ stance, should perhaps now adopt the other part of ‘Teddy’ Roosevelt’s strategy towards its vulnerable backyard, Latin America: “Walk softly, but carry a big stick.”

India definitely needs to expand its diplomatic outreach in its neighbourhood. Posting “go-getter” diplomats who have the ability to interact with all sections of society, including civil society and opposition players, people whom India has long neglected, is a must. Diplomats with past experience or with domain knowledge of the language and culture of the countries where they are posted, of course, should remain part of the strategy.

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India must prioritise timely regional interventions. In flood-hit Nepal, rapid deployment of the Gorkha Brigade, engineering corps, and medical teams should be visible on the ground. If Bangladesh faces a cyclone this winter, the Indian Navy and Air Force must lead relief operations, showcasing India’s role as the region’s first responder.

Beyond humanitarian outreach, India needs sharper intelligence and covert capabilities to anticipate and shape events in its neighbourhood, preventing external powers from turning South Asia into a geopolitical playground.

Equally vital is mastering information warfare—using media and digital platforms in Nepal, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Sri Lanka to influence narratives. Anti-Indian sentiment must be countered subtly by supporting democratic forces within politics, civil society, academia, and think tanks.

At the same time, India has to ensure the old adage “the right hand does not know what the left does” does not remain its prescribed policy. The “soft walk” must be in consonance with the “big stick” it needs to now wield on occasion, and the two should “walk the talk” together.

The writer is former head of PTI’s eastern region network.